Impermanent types and permanent reputations

Mehmet Ekmekci (), Olivier Gossner and Andrea Wilson

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 1, 162-178

Abstract: We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model with a long-run player and a series of short-run players. We provide explicit lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player, both ex-ante and following any positive probability history. Under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero, both bounds converge to the Stackelberg payoff if the type space is sufficiently rich. These limiting conditions hold in particular if the game is played very frequently.

Keywords: Reputation; Repeated games; Impermanent types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205311100158X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Impermanent types and permanent reputations (2012)
Working Paper: Impermanent types and permanent reputations (2012)
Working Paper: Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:1:p:162-178

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().