A note on Peters and Severinov, “Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices”
James Albrecht (),
Pieter Gautier () and
Susan Vroman ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 1, 389-392
We consider a market in which sellers compete for buyers by advertising reserve prices for second-price auctions. Applying the limit equilibrium concept developed in Peters and Severinov (1997) , we show that the competitive matching equilibrium is characterized by a reserve price of zero. This corrects a result in Peters and Severinov (1997) .
Keywords: Competing auctions; Directed search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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