The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

Paula Jaramillo and Vikram Manjunath

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 5, 1913-1946

Abstract: We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study problems where each person initially owns an object and every object is owned. For such problems, when preferences are strict, the “top trading cycles” algorithm provides the only rule that is efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational Ma (1994) [1]. Our contribution is to generalize this algorithm to accommodate indifference without compromising on efficiency and incentives.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Indivisible goods; Indifference; Housing market; House allocation; Existing tenants; Top trading cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053112000713
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1913-1946

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().