Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium

Claudio Mezzetti and Ludovic Renou

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 6, 2357-2375

Abstract: A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskinʼs definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskinʼs monotonicity, is necessary for mixed Nash implementation. With at least three players, set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. Important correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Implementation; Maskin monotonicity; Pure and mixed Nash equilibrium; Set-monotonicity; Social choice correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium (2012)
Working Paper: Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium (2010)
Working Paper: Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium (2009)
Working Paper: Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2357-2375

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.004

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