Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization

Maher Said

Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 147, issue 6, 2419-2438

Abstract: A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient allocation using a sequence of ascending auctions. The buyers use memoryless strategies to reveal all private information in every period, inducing symmetric behavior across different cohorts. We extend our results to revenue maximization, showing that a sequence of ascending auctions with asynchronous price clocks is an optimal mechanism.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; Indirect mechanisms; Sequential ascending auctions; Sequential allocation; Random arrivals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Working Paper: Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2419-2438

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.006

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