Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting

Matthew Jackson and Xu Tan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 1, 2-30

Abstract: A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information revelation and total utility than simple majority rule. The voting rule that maximizes information disclosure need not coincide with the voting rule that maximizes total utility. In a large enough society, full information revelation is approximated via any voting rule.

Keywords: Voting; Information; Disclosure; Deliberation; Experts; Committees; Sender-receiver (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:2-30

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.002

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