A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
Alp Atakan and
Mehmet Ekmekci ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 1, 376-392
Abstract:
We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the playersʼ equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently.
Keywords: Repeated games; Reputation; Equal discount factor; Long-run players; War of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Related works:
Working Paper: A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:376-392
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.007
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