Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

Olivier Bochet (), Rahmi İlkılıç and Herve Moulin

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 2, 535-562

Abstract: Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.

Keywords: Bipartite graph; Egalitarianism; Lorenz dominance; Single-peaked preferences; Strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D61 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:535-562

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016

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