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Coalitional manipulation on networks

Biung-Ghi Ju ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 2, 627-662

Abstract: We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network, trees, and networks without a “bridge”, and corollaries for specialized models dealing with bankruptcy, surplus sharing, cost sharing, income redistribution, social choice with transferable utility, etc.

Keywords: Allocation problem; Coalitional manipulation; Network; Reallocation-proofness; No advantageous reallocation; Strategy-proofness; Non-manipulability by merging or splitting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D30 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Coalitional Manipulation on Networks (2004) Downloads
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:627-662