No-regret dynamics and fictitious play

Yannick Viossat and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 2, 825-842

Abstract: Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Regret minimization; No-regret strategy; Fictitious play; Best-reply dynamics; Nash equilibrium; Hannan set; Curb set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:825-842

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003

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