Large games with a bio-social typology
M. Khan,
Kali P. Rath,
Yeneng Sun and
Haomiao Yu
Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 3, 1122-1149
Abstract:
We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for playerʼs names. In a sufficiently general context of traits and actions, we address this dissonance by showing a saturated probability space as being a necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and upper hemi-continuity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits. We illustrate the idealized results by corresponding asymptotic results for an increasing sequence of finite games.
Keywords: Large games; Social-type; Traits; Idealized limit game; Saturated probability space; Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; Closed-graph property; Upper hemi-continuity; Asymptotic implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D50 D82 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology (2012) 
Working Paper: On Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:3:p:1122-1149
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.002
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