Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 4, 1714-1725

Abstract: I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

Keywords: Auctions; Bid rotation; Collusion; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:4:p:1714-1725

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004

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