Strategic information transmission networks
Andrea Galeotti (),
Christian Ghiglino () and
Francesco Squintani ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 5, 1751-1769
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each othersʼ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.
Keywords: Cheap talk; Multi-agent communication; Networks; Organizations; Strategic communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:1751-1769
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