Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Takuo Sugaya and Satoru Takahashi

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 5, 1891-1928

Abstract: Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a “regular” 2×2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals.

Keywords: Repeated game; Almost-public monitoring; Private monitoring; Belief-free equilibrium; Global game; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205311300135X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:1891-1928

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().