Eliciting information from a committee

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 5, 2049-2067

Abstract: The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.

Keywords: Communication; Multidimensional mechanism design; Experts; Collusion; Axiomatic bargaining; Closed rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Eliciting Information from a Committee (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:2049-2067

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008

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