A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games

Rene van den Brink (), Gerard van der Laan and Nigel Moes

Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, issue 6, 2737-2748

Abstract: In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph.

Keywords: Implementation; Cycle-free graph game; Hierarchical outcome; Average Tree solution; Weighted hierarchical outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2737-2748

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018

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