Strategy-proof stochastic assignment

Aytek Erdil

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 151, issue C, 146-162

Abstract: I study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance.

Keywords: Random assignment; Strategy-proofness; Priority based assignment; Ordinal efficiency; School choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:146-162

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.002

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