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Dynamic strategic information transmission

Mikhail Golosov, Vasiliki Skreta (), Aleh Tsyvinski and Andrea Wilson

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 151, issue C, 304-341

Abstract: This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment drastically differs from a one-shot game. Our main result is that, under certain conditions, full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria; our result obtains with rich communication, in which non-contiguous types pool together, thereby allowing dynamic manipulation of beliefs. Essentially, conditioning future information release on past actions improves incentives for information revelation.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Cheap talk; Dynamic strategic communication; Full information revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:304-341

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.012

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