A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games

Paulo Barelli and John Duggan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 151, issue C, 596-604

Abstract: We establish that general discounted stochastic games with state transitions that are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed, atomless measure admit stationary semi-Markov perfect equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each player's action depends only on the current state and on the previous state and action profile. This resolves an open existence question stemming from an error in the proof of Theorem 4 of Chakrabarti [3]. Moreover, the result follows from “un-correlating” Nowak and Raghavan's [25] stationary correlated equilibrium, establishing that there is no need to resort to additional, unmodeled state variables.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Existence; Stationary equilibrium; Semi-Markov perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053114000271
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:596-604

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().