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Revision proofness

Laurence Ales and Christopher Sleet

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 152, issue C, 324-355

Abstract: We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof. However, for the important class of quasi-recursive games careful construction of off-equilibrium play can render many, and in some cases all, sub-game perfect paths revision-proof.

Keywords: Dynamic games; Repeated games; Renegotiation-proofness; Equilibrium refinements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.008

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