Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents

Alejandro Saporiti

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 154, issue C, 216-228

Abstract: We study a social choice model with partially honest agents, and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation. This result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity property; and it offers as a by-product a revelation principle for secure implementation with partial honesty. We apply the implementation concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes, in combination with unanimity, the family of augmented representative voter schemes.

Keywords: Secure implementation; Partial honesty; Strategy-proofness; Rectangularity; Single-crossing preferences; Representative (median) voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Securely Implementable Social Choice Rules with Partially Honest Agents (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:216-228

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.006

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