Payoffs in exact TU economies

Omer Edhan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 155, issue C, 152-184

Abstract: We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underlying nonatomic exact market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens [23] value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always a core element, this result provides an axiomatization of the Mertens value as a core-selection. Previous works in this direction assumed the economies to be either differentiable (e.g., Dubey and Neyman [11]) or of uniform finite-type (e.g., Haimanko [16]). Our work does not assume that, thus it contributes to the axiomatic study of payoffs in perfectly competitive economies (or values of their derived market games) in general. In fact, this is the first contribution in this direction.

Keywords: Perfect competition; Value theory; Large economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 D46 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:152-184

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.012

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