A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 1-27

Abstract: This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.

Keywords: Learning; Stochastic stability; Matching; Marriage; College admissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C73 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Working Paper: A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.015

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