Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market

Rodrigo Velez

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 1114-1129

Abstract: We study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal-income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents. Strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents. They non-cooperatively coordinate on the equal-income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are Pareto undominated for them within the set of equal-income competitive allocations. Sincere agents are protected to some extent, however. Their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff.

Keywords: Equal-income competitive social choice functions; Sincere and sophisticated agents; Indivisible goods; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1114-1129

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006

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