Key leaders in social networks

Junjie Zhou and Ying-Ju Chen

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 212-235

Abstract: This paper examines optimal targeting and sequencing strategies in the setup proposed by Ballester et al. [3]. The setup features payoff externalities and strategic complementarity among players, who non-cooperatively determine their contributions. We first analyze a two-stage game in which players in the leader group make contributions before the follower group. We construct an exact index to identify the (single) key leader, and demonstrate that the key leader can differ substantially from the key player who most influences the network in the simultaneous-move game. Using Taylor expansions on the strength of network effects, we establish an isomorphism between the optimal leader group selection (targeting) strategy and the classical weighted maximum-cut problem. This approach leads to some design principles for unweighted complete graphs and bipartite graphs.

Keywords: Social networks; Dynamic games; Key leader; Targeting; Sequencing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D29 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:212-235

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.005

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