Matching markets under (in)complete information

Lars Ehlers and Jordi Masso

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 295-314

Abstract: We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common prior, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching market; Stability; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Matching Markets under (In)complete Information (2007)
Working Paper: Matching Markets under (In)complete Information (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:295-314

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008

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