Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
Alexander Reffgen
Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 349-383
Abstract:
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restricted preferences by Sen [34]. We provide complete characterizations of the strategy-proof social choice functions on both multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. For both domains, we also identify the subclasses consisting of all anonymous strategy-proof social choice functions.
Keywords: Social choice function; Strategy-proofness; Single-peakedness; Spatial voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:349-383
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010
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