On the private provision of public goods on networks

Nizar Allouch

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 527-552

Abstract: This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for general networks and best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Warr [38] and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian [6] whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision financed by lump-sum taxes. To this effect, we show that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond a special network architecture in the neighborhood of the set of contributors.

Keywords: Public goods; Nash equilibrium; Uniqueness; Networks; Neutrality; Bonacich centrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D31 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (78)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks (2012)
Working Paper: On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks (2012)
Working Paper: On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:527-552

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.007

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