Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals

Simone Galperti

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 648-667

Abstract: This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by studying a simpler game in which they can offer only menus of decisions and send cheap-talk signals to the agent. For games in which the principals instead participate in making final decisions, we can characterize all their outcomes by studying a simpler game in which principals can again send cheap-talk signals but can offer only menus of direct mechanisms, to which they report their information truthfully.

Keywords: Common agency; Informed principal; Inscrutability Principle; Delegation Principle; Menu; Signal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:648-667

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.018

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