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Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources

Albin Erlanson and Karol Flores-Szwagrzak ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, issue PA, 137-162

Abstract: We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and resource-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Consistency; Resource-monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:137-162

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016

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