Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation

Takuro Yamashita

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, issue PA, 267-279

Abstract: This paper discusses connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of agents' behavior. Specifically, under “rich” interdependent-value environments (including private-value environments as a special case), we show that the implementation of any social choice correspondence in (one-round or iterative) undominated strategies is equivalent to Bayesian implementation with arbitrary type spaces.

Keywords: Implementation; Robust implementation; Strategic and structural uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053115001234
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:267-279

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.005

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().