Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, issue PA, 401-442

Abstract: This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately implementable.

Keywords: Implementation; Undetectability; Efficiency; Dynamic; Mechanism design; Markov processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments (2013)
Working Paper: Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:401-442

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009

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