Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

Marion Oury

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, issue PA, 656-677

Abstract: Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner is not entirely sure of the validity of his model and thus wants the social choice function to be not only (partially) implemented at all types of the initial model, but also at all types “close” to those types. In addition, we assume that the social planner also has some doubts on the payoffs of the outcomes and thus wants his prediction to be robust when these payoffs are close but not exactly equal to those in the initial model. Under this local payoff uncertainty, the present paper establishes the following full characterization result for finite mechanisms: a social choice function is continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies.

Keywords: High order beliefs; Robust implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053115001301
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:656-677

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.007

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().