Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach

Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 159, issue PB, 819-853

Abstract: We characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for time separable allocation problems in continuous time. The willingness-to-pay of each agent is private information and changes over time.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; Repeated sales; Stochastic flow; Flat rates; Two-part tariffs; Leasing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach (2015)
Working Paper: Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach (2015)
Working Paper: Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach (2015)
Working Paper: Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach (2014)
Working Paper: Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pb:p:819-853

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.009

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