Consistency and communication in committees

Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar and Mark T. Le Quement

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 160, issue C, 24-35

Abstract: We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

Keywords: Committees; Voting; Information aggregation; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:160:y:2015:i:c:p:24-35

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004

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