In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting

Julián García and Matthijs van Veelen

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 161, issue C, 161-189

Abstract: In the repeated prisoner's dilemma there is no strategy that is evolutionarily stable, and a profusion of neutrally stable ones. But how stable is neutrally stable? We show that in repeated games with large enough continuation probabilities, where the stage game is characterized by a conflict between individual and collective interests, there is always a neutral mutant that can drift into a population that is playing an equilibrium, and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. The existence of stepping stone paths out of any equilibrium determines the dynamics in finite populations playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Keywords: Repeated games; Evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:161:y:2016:i:c:p:161-189

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007

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