Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining

Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 162, issue C, 209-236

Abstract: We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman's policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible. But the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change. The results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies.

Keywords: Intermediaries; Middlemen; Bargaining; Legislatures; Vote buying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Power Brokers: Middlemen in Legislative Bargaining (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:162:y:2016:i:c:p:209-236

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011

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