Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality

Jernej Copic and Clara Ponsati

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 163, issue C, 276-287

Abstract: A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.

Keywords: Bilateral trade; Incomplete information; Mechanism design; Robustness; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D40 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:276-287

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008

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