Random extensive form games

Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 166, issue C, 517-535

Abstract: We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a novel way with a solid strategic justification to implement a Pareto efficient outcome for two-player implementation problems.

Keywords: Random games; Extensive form games; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053116300849
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:166:y:2016:i:c:p:517-535

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.010

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().