Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints

Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 168, issue C, 107-142

Abstract: Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. To guide market designers faced with constraints, we propose new stability concepts. A matching is strongly stable if satisfying blocking pairs inevitably violates a constraint. We show that a strongly stable matching may not exist, and that existence is guaranteed if and only if all distributional constraints are trivial. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a more permissive concept, weak stability. We demonstrate a weakly stable matching always exists, implies efficiency, and is characterized by standard normative axioms. These results are obtained in a more general environment than those in existing studies, accommodating a wide variety of applications.

Keywords: Matching; Distributional constraints; Efficiency; Stability; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D47 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:107-142

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006

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