Implementation via approval mechanisms

Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 170, issue C, 169-181

Abstract: We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative; and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum – including the Condorcet winner alternative – there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implements the Condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Strategy-proofness; Approval voting; Single-peakedness; Condorcet winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D71 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:169-181

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003

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