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Two-sided matching with indifferences

Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin

Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 171, issue C, 268-292

Abstract: Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm cannot be applied to produce a Pareto efficient or a worker-optimal stable matching.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Matching with ties; Matching with indifferences; Efficient and stable matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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