Economics at your fingertips  

Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?

Hülya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 171, issue C, 293-315

Abstract: It is commonly believed that voting rules that are relatively more inclusive (e.g., unanimity or supermajority), are likely to yield relatively more equitable outcomes than simple-majority rule. We show that this is not necessarily the case in bargaining environments. We study a multilateral bargaining model à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where players are heterogeneous with respect to the potential surplus they bring to the bargaining table. We show that unanimity rule may generate equilibrium outcomes that are more unequal (or less equitable) than under majority rule. In fact, as players become relatively more patient, we show that the more inclusive the voting rule, the less equitable the equilibrium allocations.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; Voting rules; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic? (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic? (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetics? (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2019-10-11
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:171:y:2017:i:c:p:293-315