Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items

Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 172, issue C, 313-347

Abstract: Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple “one-dimensional” mechanisms, such as selling the goods separately, guarantee at least73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least 50% when they are independent.

Keywords: Revenue maximization; Mechanism design; Auctions; Multiple goods; Bundling; Separate selling; Simple mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D42 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (2017)
Working Paper: Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (2012)
Working Paper: Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:172:y:2017:i:c:p:313-347

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001

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