Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder

Brian Baisa () and Justin Burkett

Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 174, issue C, 1-15

Abstract: We compare equilibrium bidding in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when a single large bidder (i.e., with multi-unit demand) competes against many small bidders, each with single-unit demands. We show that the large bidder prefers the discriminatory auction over the uniform-price auction, and we provide general conditions under which small bidders have the reverse preference. We use examples to show that the efficiency and revenue rankings of the two auctions are ambiguous.

Keywords: Auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Market power; Large auctions; Asymmetric first price auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D47 D61 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:1-15

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.010

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