Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
Takakazu Honryo ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 174, issue C, 273-287
This paper addresses the issue of risky shifts by a multi-sender signaling game. Senders compete in making proposals to be adopted by a group, hence they try to signal that they have the ability to correctly observe the state. This paper shows that senders tend to avoid making a moderate proposal, because a moderate proposal signals incompetence. When facing a moderate and a risky proposal, the group tends to adopt the risky one, and we have risky shifts as a result.
Keywords: Signaling game; Risky shifts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:273-287
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell
More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().