Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games

Carmen Camacho, Takashi Kamihigashi and Çağrı Sağlam

Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 174, issue C, 288-299

Abstract: A policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial, affecting some people positively but others negatively. In this paper we extend the “robust comparative statics” result for large aggregative games established by Acemoglu and Jensen (2010) to possibly controversial policy changes. In particular, we show that both the smallest and the largest equilibrium values of an aggregate variable increase in response to a policy change to which individuals' reactions may be mixed but the overall aggregate response is positive. We provide sufficient conditions for such a policy change in terms of distributional changes in parameters.

Keywords: Large aggregative games; Robust comparative statics; Positive shocks; Stochastic dominance; Mean-preserving spreads (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C60 C62 C72 D04 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Robust comparative statics of non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games (2018)
Working Paper: Robust comparative statics of non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games (2018)
Working Paper: Robust Comparative Statics for Non-monotone Shocks in Large Aggregative Games (2017)
Working Paper: Robust Comparative Statics for Non-monotone Shocks in Large Aggregative Games (2016)
Working Paper: Robust Comparative Statics of Non-monotone Shocks in Large Aggregative Games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:288-299

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.003

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