Time consistency and time invariance in collective intertemporal choice

Antony Millner and Geoffrey Heal

Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 176, issue C, 158-169

Abstract: Recent work on collective intertemporal choice suggests that non-dictatorial social preferences are generically time inconsistent. We argue that this claim conflates time consistency with two distinct properties of preferences: stationarity and time invariance. While time invariance and stationarity together imply time consistency, the converse does not hold. Although non-dictatorial social preferences cannot be stationary, they may be time consistent if time invariance is abandoned. If individuals are discounted utilitarians, revealed preference provides no guidance on whether social preferences should be time consistent or time invariant. Nevertheless, we argue that time invariant social preferences are often normatively and descriptively problematic.

Keywords: Collective decisions; Intertemporal choice; Time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D71 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:158-169

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.002

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