Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 176, issue C, 761-802
We study a dynamic trading game in which the information asymmetry between the agents develops over time. A seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good, but the seller becomes informed after the game begins. We show that this developing adverse selection gives rise to novel trading dynamics. In particular, if the seller's learning speed is high, the equilibrium features “collapse-and-recovery” behavior: Both the equilibrium price and the trade probability first drop and then increase over time. While the trade surplus monotonically decreases as the learning speed increases, the seller's surplus may change non-monotonically.
Keywords: Adverse selection; Learning; Dynamic games; Information economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:761-802
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