A college admissions clearinghouse
M. Bumin Yenmez
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 176, issue C, 859-885
Abstract:
I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions where students can commit to enroll, as in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences, and they can be matched with multiple colleges simultaneously. This clearinghouse keeps the desirable properties of decentralized college admissions, like commitment and yield management, while getting rid of the undesirable aspects, such as unfairness and unraveling.
Keywords: College admissions; Many-to-many matching; Path independence; Substitutability; Modification; Law of aggregate demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:859-885
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.010
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